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Casenotes

Bennis v. Michigan: The Supreme Court
Clings to Precedent and Denies Innocent
Owners a Defense to Forfeiture
In Bennis v. Michigan,1 the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of a Michigan statute2 authorizing the forfeiture of an innocent
owner's interest in property under the guise of a statutory nuisance
abatement scheme.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After convicting petitioner's husband of gross indecency, the State of
Michigan then sued both petitioner and her husband to have their car
declared a public nuisance and abated as such, because the crime was
committed in a neighborhood known for prostitution.4 The Wayne
County Circuit Court judge rejected petitioner's argument that her
interest in the car should not be forfeited because she did not know that
her husband would use the car illegally when she entrusted it to him.5

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
See MICH. COMP. LAws § 600,3815(2) (1987).
116 S. Ct. at 998.
Id.
Id. at 997.
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The circuit judge declared the car a public nuisance and ordered its
abatement by forfeiture, instead of ordering a sale and division of the
proceeds, because of the car's minimal value.6
Ignoring the language of the Michigan statute authorizing the
forfeiture,7 the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that
Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting the abatement statute
prevented the State from abating petitioner's interest in the car unless
she knew her husband's intentions when she entrusted the car to him.'
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the abatement in its entirety by concluding that the State
does not need to prove that the owner knew of or had agreed to allow the
illegal use of the entrusted vehicle.9
Based upon the United States Supreme Court rulings in Van Oster i'.
Kansas0 and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,1 the
Michigan Supreme Court found that the State's failure to provide an
innocent-owner defense was "without constitutional consequence." 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 3
The Court held that the forfeiture order did not offend the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Judicial consideration of an innocent-owner defense has a long history
in this country. In 1827, the Supreme Court first considered the
constitutionality of a forfeiture proceeding involving an innocent owner
5 There,
in The Palmyra."
a vessel was used in acts of piracy on the
open seas and the Court held that the shipowner's conviction was not
necessary to enforce the forfeiture of the vessel.' 6 The Court created
a fiction that the vessel itself was guilty of the acts and that the
forfeiture proceeded against the vessel stating, "[Tihe thing here is

6. Id.
7.

8.

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3815(2) (1987).
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.

9. Id.
10.

272 U.S. 465 (1926).

11. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
12. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
13. Id. at 998.

14. Id. at 997-1001.
15. 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
16. Id. at 14.
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primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing .... ,
Fifty years later, the Court was confronted with the same issue in
Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 8 in which a leased premises was
used as a distillery. 9 Using the same reasoning employed in The
Palmyra, the Court concluded that the forfeiture was claimed against
the distillery and the real and personal property used in connection with
it.2" However, the Court stated it would not consider the guilt of the
owner "beyond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the
property to the distiller, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the
lessee as a distillery." 21
In J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 22 an automobile
owned by the Grant Company was used to transport distilled spirits, in
violation of the revenue statutes.' The Court again employed the
fiction that the thing was the offender and held that the forfeiture did
not violate the Fifth Amendment.24 Only five years later in 1926, the
Court in Van Oster v. Kansas2 5 considered the constitutionality of a
Kansas statute21 that had been used in the forfeiture of an automobile.27 In that case, the car had been used to transport distilled liquor
and was declared a common nuisance, and forfeited. 28 Adhering to
precedent, the Court again held that "[iut has long been settled that
statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or
lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the
United States is not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."29 Further, the Court noted that some uses of property
are "so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril." 0
Nearly fifty years later in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., ' the Court ruled that forfeitures are not unconstitutional because

17.
18.

Id
96 U.S. 395 (1877).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 401.
254 U.S. 505 (1921).
Id.at 508-09.
Id. at 511-13.
272 U.S. 465 (1926).

26.

See 1919 KAN. SESS. LAWS §§ 1-5, 21-2162 to 2167.

27. 272 U.S. at 466.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 468.
30. Id. at 467.
31. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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of their application to innocent owners of property 2 The Court
specifically noted that "confiscation may have the desirable effect of
inducing [owners] to exercise greater care in transferring possession of
their property.' However, the Court quickly pointed out that innocent
owners who proved that they had done all that could reasonably be
expected to prevent the illegal use of their property would be able to
successfully challenge such a forfeiture.34 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Douglas advocated the recognition of a common-law defense
that
35
required owners only to prove that they, in fact, were innocent.
Recently, in Austin v. United States,3" the Court considered the
innocent-owner defense to forfeiture in a constitutional challenge
grounded on the notion that all forfeitures were subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment." In holding that forfeitures
are subject to Eighth Amendment limitations, the Court noted that the
guilty-property fiction used initially in The Palmyra had never been
applied when an innocent owner had done everything reasonably
possible to prevent the illegal use of his property." Further, the Court
specifically stated that "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the
owner." 9 Thus, the Court laid a logical foundation to overrule nearly
a hundred and seventy years worth of precedent upon the next
opportunity and create an innocent-owner defense to all forfeitures.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

The decision in Bennis adhered to precedent despite the Court's
inclination in Austin that it might overrule previous decisions.4' The
Court initially reviewed the Palmyra line of decisions that affirmed the
proposition that an owner's innocence is not a defense to forfeiture
because4 the property itself is the subject of the proceeding, not the
owner.

1

Turning to its most recent decision directly on point, Calero-Toledo,
the Court rejected petitioner's argument based on a passage in Calero-

32. Id. at 690.
33. Id. at 688.
34.

Id. at 689-90.

35. Id. at 694 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
37. Id. at 604. The Excessive Fines Clause reads as follows: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

38. 509 U.S. at 615-16.
39. Id. at 618.
40. 116 S. Ct. at 994.
41. Id. at 998-99.
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Toledo that suggested a constitutional attack may be successful if the
owner had done everything reasonably possible to prevent the illegal use
of the property.42 The Court stated that because the statement was
mere dictum in that opinion, it had no binding authority on the Court's
decision.4' The Court then rejected the argument that an innocent
owner, much like a criminal defendant, may not be punished for a crime
for which he has not been found guilty." The Court pointed out that
the case which was used in support of this argument "did not discuss, let
alone overrule, the Palmyra line of cases."'
In response to language in its most recent decision discussing the
innocent-owner defense, the Court discussed Austin." The Court said
that Austin did not deal with the validity of the innocent-owner defense,
but instead pointed out that the owner's innocence was further evidence
of a statute's punitive character.47
In addressing the main assertions of the dissent, the Court majority
adhered to binding precedent. The dissent first asserted that the earlier
decisions treated contraband and instrumentalities used to convey
contraband differently, because of the more guilty nature of the
contraband.4 8 The majority dismissed this notion stating, "[tihis
Court's precedent has never made the due process inquiry depend on
whether the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the
principal use."' The dissent also argued that the Palmyraline of cases
would allow the forfeiture of "an ocean liner just because one of its
passengers sinned while on board."' Addressing this contention, the
Court majority refused to place limits on its decision and ruled that
"when such application shall be made it will be time enough to
pronounce upon it."51 The dissent also argued that such a forfeiture
serves no deterrent purpose because petitioner, or any wife, would likely
entrust her car to her husband without a second thought.5 2 The Court
majority found that forfeiture serves two distinct purposes: (1) to
prevent further illicit use of the property and (2) to render illegal

42. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 689 (1974)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1000.
45. Id. (discussing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1004-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 999-1000.
50. Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1000 (quoting Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 512).
52. Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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behavior unprofitable by imposing an economic penalty.0 Therefore,
the Court held that petitioner was not denied due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment because she was not able to use an innocentowner defense. 4 Addressing petitioner's next argument that the
forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, the Court simply held that when a forfeiture did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the government is not required to
compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully
acquired.55
Of particular interest to the concurring opinions was the fact that the
trial court exercised its lawful discretion in an equitable proceeding.'
The concurring opinions noted that had the judge agreed to a sale and
division of the proceeds, petitioner would likely not have recovered any
money because of the minimal value of the car.57 Thus, the concurring
opinions argued, petitioner is in no worse position than if the judge had
done otherwise.5"
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Despite one hundred and seventy years of social, economic, and
industrial change, this decision clearly adheres to precedent rooted in
early, nineteenth-century admiralty law cases such as The Palmyra. By
holding that a state need not allow innocent owners a defense against
forfeiture, the Court's ruling allows states to pass aggressive forfeiture
statutes, specifically nuisance-abatement statutes, to accomplish the
legitimate state interest of preventing crime.' Further, the rationale
that petitioner is in no worse position because of the minimal value of
the car seems to advance the position that where an owner's interest in
property is of little monetary value, as opposed to sentimental or
personal value, the interest is so insignificant that it does not deserve
due process protection.60
However, the Court specifically refused to answer how it would rule
in a specific factual instance in which the illegal act was of little
significance but the property to be forfeited was of great value.61 By
doing so, the Court has left citizens in a state of limbo over what

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1000 (citing Calero.Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687).
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. (Thomas, J. & Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1011.

61. Id. at 1000.
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property might be subjected to forfeiture in various circumstances. For
example, suppose a tenant solicited a prostitute for sex in a large
apartment complex owned by three individuals. Although each is truly
an innocent owner, perhaps the Court would uphold the sale of the
apartment complex and the division of the proceeds, thus confiscating a
portion of the money received from the sale as well as the future
potential profits of the owners.62
Following this decision, in United States v. Ursery,' the Court
distinguished Austin and held that not all forfeitures serve a punitive
purpose for purposes of double jeopardy analysis (effectively prohibiting
the arguments advanced by petitioner in Bennis in support of an
innocent-owner defense).'
If the Court's reluctancy to abandon
precedent over the past one hundred and seventy years is any indication
of the lasting effect of this decision, then Bennis is here to stay.
MARK E. BEATTY

62. See 116 S. Ct. at 1003.
63. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
64. Id. at 2149. Because Ursery holds that not all forfeitures serve a punitive purpose,
the statement in Austin that "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner" is
negated.

